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Section 3. It shall be unlawful for a labor organization or its members or employees
to engage in a strike, boycott or other concerted activities where an object thereof is
to compel any employer to enter into a contract or agreement prohibited by Section 2,
provided that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit a labor
organization from excluding an employer from the market as an incident of a current
dispute with such employer concerning the association or representation of employees or their terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

ADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES

Tim NATIONAL GoVENiENT Am W!RETAPPING

Wiretapping became a matter of public concern early in the twentieth century when the development of mechanical and electrical devices enabled a third party secretly to overhear and record conversations
transmitted over a telephone wire.' In 1918 Congress authorized the
President, whenever he deemed it necessary for national security, to
assume control of the telephone system for the duration of World
War 1.2 When it became apparent that the telephone wires could be
secretly tapped, Congress placed an absolute ban on wiretapping for
the duration of governmental operation of the lines.3
During the 1920's wiretapping was conducted by federal agents to
enforce the prohibition legislation. In 1928 a case arose in which evidence of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act was
obtained by government agents by tapping a telephone line and overhearing the parties to the conspiracy. A conviction was secured on the
basis of this evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the use of wiretap evidence in federal
courts violates the fourth amendment.4 Chief Justice Taft,
speaking for
a majority of the Court in Olmstead v. United States,5 ruled that wire1. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,

52 COLUM. L. REv. 165, 172 (1952).
2. 40 Stat. 904 (1918).
8. 40 Stat. 1017 (1918).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
5. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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tapping does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. Justice Taft noted that the Court in previous cases
had construed the fourth amendment liberally, but this did not "justify
enlargement of the language employed [in the amendment] beyond the
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so
to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight."0
In other words, since wiretapping does not involve an actual physical
invasion of the premises, it does not come within the protection of the
fourth amendment.
After the Olmstead decision, wiretapping was neither unconstitutional nor a federal crime,7 and evidence obtained by intercepting telephone conversations was admissible in federal courts. However, in 1934
Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act,8 which created the
Federal Communications Commission and invested the Commission
with jurisdiction over radio, telegraph, and telephone communications.
Included in this act was a section pertaining to the interception and
divulgence of messages. Section 605 declared, among other things, that
"no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person. . . ."I It is doubtful that Congress intended for section 605
to prohibit law-enforcement wiretapping. 10 In any event, in 1937 the
Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States" ruled that the Federal
Communications Act bans wiretap evidence from criminal cases in the
federal courts. justice Roberts, speaking for the majority, explained that
"no person in section 605 includes federal agents and that the barring of
communications to "any person" precludes recitation of the contents of
intercepted messages as testimony in court.' 2 Justice Sutherland, dissenting, argued that "person" in section 605 should not be construed to
include a federal agent acting in his official capacity. 13
6. Id. at 465.
7. Westin, supranote 1, at 173.
8. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§151-609 (1958).
9. 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
10. Alan Westin, Professor of Government at Columbia University, in 1961 told
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that "having looked at every
page and at every hearing and at the public comment on the Radio Act of 1927 and
the Communications Act of 1934, I personally am persuaded that Congress never
had the intention of dealing with law enforcement wiretapping in that statute."
Hearingson Wiretappingand EavesdroppingLegislationBefore a Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 243 (1961).
11. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. Id. at 382.
13. Id. at 385 (dissenting opinion). For other critiques of the Court's decision
see 38 Micr.L. Rnv. 1097 (1940); Note, 6 CEo. WAsH.L. Ray. 826 (1938).
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After the Nardone defendants were reconvicted in the lower court,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and again reversed their convictions, extending the rule of inadmissibility not only to intercepted messages but also to evidence procured through knowledge gained from
such messages.' 4 In the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter, reasoned
that "to forbid the direct use of methods . ..characterized [as inadmissible in the previous case] but to put no curb on their full indirect
use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty. ""5
On March 18, 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson issued a
statement1" that the Justice Department would "completely abandon"
wiretapping in order to comply with the Nardone decisions. President
Roosevelt, however, directed a confidential letter to the Attorney General, authorizing him to approve wiretapping when necessary for the
defense of the nation.' 7 In 1941 Attorney General Jackson, to justify
wiretapping by the Justice Department, advanced an interpretation of
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. The phrase "intercept
.. .and divulge," Jackson maintained, is an inseparable unit; therefore,
the statute does not prohibit wiretapping if the intercepted information
is not subsequently divulged. Jackson contended further that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a single "person" under the statute and,
therefore, sharing of wiretap information among the personnel of the
Bureau does not constitute a divulgence in the sense that the statute
makes illegal.' 8 Justice Department wiretapping was continued after

14. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 388 (1939).
15. Id. at 340. Although the Court disposed of this case with a short opinion and
only one dissent (McReynolds), the ruling seems highly significant, for wiretap
information may be more valuable as leads than as evidence in court. See statement
of Samuel Dash, Attorney at Law, Hearings on Wiretapping, supra note 10, at 105.
Mr. Dash maintains that police officers generally use wiretap information only as
leads, for they have found that convictions on wiretap evidence result in pressures
by bar association groups and civil liberty organizations on the legislatures to
prohibit police wiretapping. On the other hand, the ruling may have little impact,
for wiretapping is probably practiced extensively today, and the information obtained
is unlikely to turn up in court. See statement of Charles A. Reich, Yale Professor of
Law, Hearings on Wiretapping, supra note 10, at 190. The second Nardone case
was peculiar in this regard because the use of wiretap information in the case had
already been revealed in the first hearing of the case.
16. 86 CoNG. REc. 1471-72 (1940) (statement of the Attorney General).
17. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Yale Law Journal,Feb. 25, 1949, 58 YA.Ln
L.J. 423 (1949).
18. See Westin, supra note 1, at 168-69. Justice Roberts' opinion in the first
Nardone case did not mention Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in
which the Court formulated the federal rule that evidence secured illegally must on
motion be excluded from the pending trial in federal courts. This suggests that the
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World War I119 and is a current practice. 20
On the same day of the second Nardone ruling, the Supreme Court
ruled in Weiss v. United States21 that the provisions of section 605 apply
to intrastate as well as interstate and foreign commerce and bar admission in the federal courts of evidence obtained by interception of such
intrastate telephone communications. 22
The Court limited the federal exclusionary rule in two cases decided
in 1942. In Goldstein v. United States2 3 testimony of two prospective
witnesses had been secured by government agents by confronting the
witnesses with recordings of their telephone conversations and threatening to prosecute them on the basis of this evidence if they refused to
testify. When the witnesses testified, the defendants protested, contending that the testimony had been obtained in violation of section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act. The Supreme Court by a five-to-three
vote sustained the conviction. Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority,
stated that one not a party to a tapped conversation has no standing to
object to its use by the government to obtain evidence. 24 In Goldman v.
United States25 the Court held that the overhearing with a dictaphone
of one end of a telephone conversation involved neither an "interception"
nor a "communication" within the purview of section 605, and, therefore,
26
the evidence obtained was admissible.
In the 1957 case of Benanti v. United States,2 7 the Court unanimously
ruled that section 605 bars wiretap evidence from federal courts, regardjustices may have anticipated the Attorney General's argument that a mere interception would not be illegal under §605 and, thus, be inadmissible under the Weeks
rule.
19. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1950, p. 9, cols. 5-6.
20. The Justice Department maintained seventy-eight wiretaps during 1960 and
eighty-five to the date of the hearings in May 1961. See the statement of Herbert J.
Miller, Jr., Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Hearings on Wiretapping, supranote 10, at 863, 366.
21. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
22. The Court further ruled that the prosecutors had not obtained "authorization
of the sender" under §605 by confronting one of the conversants with offers of
leniency and persuading him to turn state's evidence. The wiretap information
remained inadmissible. Weiss v. United States, supranote 22, at 329-30.
23. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
24. Justice Murphy, spealdng in dissent for himself, Justice Frankfurter, and
Chief Justice Stone, argued that the decision in this case should have been controlled
by Nardone and Weiss and the evidence held inadmissible. 316 U.S. 114, 126
(1942) (dissenting opinion).
25. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
26. Justices Stone and Frankfurter, dissenting, could not distinguish in principle
between the instant case and Olmstead, supranote 5. However, they were prepared
to overrule Olmstead if the majority had been willing. 316 U.S. 129, 140-41 (1942)
(dissenting opinion).
27. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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less of whether it was obtained by state or federal agents. However, the
Court did not restrict the limitations that had been placed on the exclusionary rule by the Goldstein and Goldmancases.
In summary, it can be said that there is no constitutional prohibition
or limitation on wiretapping. Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 bars from federal courts evidence obtained by tapping interstate or intrastate telephone wires, regardless of whether the wiretap
was conducted by federal or state agents. This exclusionary rule extends
to evidence obtained through knowledge gained from such wiretaps.
Limitations to this rule include rulings that one not a party to a tapped
conversation has no standing to object to its use by the Government to
obtain evidence, and that evidence obtained by overhearing only one
end of a telephone conversation is admissible in federal courts.
TBE STATES AND WnMErPING

Wiretapping constitutes a problem in federalism for two reasons.
First, wiretap statutes in many states differ in substance from the Federal Communications Act as it has been construed by the Supreme
Court. Second, the rules of evidence in many states differ from the
Court's construction of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,
and from the federal rule formulated by the Court in Weeks v. United
States,28 whereby evidence illegally obtained is inadmissible in federal
courts.
Thirty-three states have statutes that prohibit wiretapping. Six states
have statutes that permit wiretapping by police officers; five of these
statutes require a court order for wiretapping; Louisiana permits police
wiretapping without a court order. Eleven states have no statutes on
wiretapping. Twenty-four states admit as evidence in their courts wiretap information obtained by state officers. Included in these twenty-four
states are five states that have no statutes on wiretapping and thirteen
29
states that prohibit wiretapping.
The discrepancy between state wiretap prohibition statutes and the
admission of wiretap evidence in their courts is explainable on two
counts. First, the rule in Weeks v. United States represented an exercise
by the Supreme Court of its supervisory power over lower federal courts,
and therefore is not applicable to the rules of evidence followed by state
courts on matters not relating to the rights of the parties under the
federal constitution. Second, several states that prohibit wiretapping by
28. 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see note 18 supra.
29. STArF OF SUScmmO. ON CONSTrrrrIoNAL BIGHTS, STrATn Coinr. ON
JUDICIALtY, 87TH CONG., 1sT SEss., STATE STATUTES ON Wn-rAPpING (Comm. Print

1961). For an analysis of the wiretapping legislation of the various states see Hearings on Wiretapping,supranote 10, at 540-42.
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statute do not apply these statutes to law-enforcement officers acting in
their official capacity.30
In Schwartz v. Texas,3 1 the Supreme Court considered the application of the Federal Communications Act to the admissibility of wiretap
evidence in state courts. The Court ruled eight-to-one that section 605
does not bar the admission of wiretap conversations as evidence in a
criminal proceeding in a state court. Justice Minton added that 2
indeed, evidence obtained by a state officer by means which
would constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution is nonetheless admissible in a state court ....

[I]n the absence of an expression by

Congress [Section 605] is simply an additional factor for a state
to consider in formulating a rule of evidence for use in its own
courts.
However, in the 1957 Benanti case, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the entire Court, advanced a dictum that admission of wiretap evidence
in a state court contrary to section 605 would constitute a federal
33
crime.
[K]eeping in mind [the] comprehensive scheme of interstate
regulation and the public policy underlying section 605 as part of
that scheme, we find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in
plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which would
contradict that section and that policy.
The Benanti dictum implied that admission of wiretap information
as evidence in state courts would not be tolerated. Consequently, in
1961 a suit was filed in a federal court to enjoin the use of evidence obtained by court-ordered wiretaps in a New York state criminal trial.3 4
30. The courts of Florida have followed Schwartz v. Texas, and held §605 of
the Federal Communications Act inapplicable to proceedings in the state courts of
Florida. Williams v. State, 109 So. 2d 379 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), cert. denied 113
So. 2d 836 (1959); Griffith v. State, 111 So. 2d 282 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Although FLA. STAT. §822.10 (1961) prohibits wiretapping, the court in Griflith
further held that evidence obtained through wiretapping is not inadmissible because
obtained in violation of the statute. Griffith v. State, supra at 287. However, the
court considered wiretapping violative of §12 and §22 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Florida Constitution, and held that "the use as evidence of conversations
overheard through wiretapping in effect compels a defendant in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself, in violation of Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights."
Griffith v. State, supra at 287. This ruling would seem to render wiretap evidence
excludable from future criminal cases in the state courts of Florida.
31. 844 U.S. 199 (1952).
32. Id. at 201.
83. Benanti v. United States, supra note 27, at 105-06.
34. N.Y. CODE CaM.. PRoc. §818 (a) authorizes court-order wiretapping by
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The Supreme Court received the case on certiorari and delivered a
one-sentence, per curiam opinion. Citing Schwartz, and Stefanelli v.
Minard,3 5 the Court in Pugachv. Dollinger8 ruled that "a federal court
may not enjoin the use in a criminal trial in a state court of evidence
obtained by wiretapping in violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act."
Despite the Court's ruling in Pugach,several judges of New York
state criminal courts have subsequently said they will no longer sign
wiretap orders, since they consider this a federal crime under section
605 as construed in Benanti by the Supreme Court.3 7 And, it has been
argued that private individuals or public officials may be hesitant to
come into a state court with wiretap information because of the possibility of self-incrimination under the Federal Communications Act or
under state wiretap prohibition statutes where the common-law rule of
evidence is followed. 38
The Supreme Court's 1961 ruling in Mapp v. Ohio,3 9 although not
concerned with wiretapping per se, might indicate the direction in
which the Court is moving on wiretapping. In the Mapp case, the Court

law-enforcement officers.
35. 342 U.S. 117 (1951). The Court ruled that federal courts should not intervene instate criminal proceedings to enjoin the use of evidence even when claimed
to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure.
36. 365 U.S. 458 (1961), Justice Douglas, speaking for himself and Chief Justice
Warren, dissented, maintaining that the Court in Benanti"held that the proscription
of wiretapping contained in §605 forbade wiretapping by an authorized executive
officer of the State, acting under the explicit terms of a state statute and pursuant to
a warrant issued by the state judiciary." Pugach v. Dollinger, supra at 459-60.
37. See statement of Daniel Gutman, Dean, New York Law School, Hearingson
Wiretapping, supra note 10, at 80-81.
38. See statement of Robinson 0. Everett, Professor of Law, Duke University,
Hearings on Wiretapping,supra note 10, at 268. An editorial in the Buffalo (New
York) Courier-Express, Nov. 19, 1961, stated that District Attorney Frank Hogan,
New York County, New York, dropped prosecution of seven defendants accused of
being top men in a multi-million dollar narcotics ring. The assistant prosecutor advanced the opinion that the wiretap evidence established the guilt of the men, but
the decision was made not to submit the evidence because submission would have
made the district attorney liable for prosecution under the Federal Communications
Act. 108 CONG. REc. A716 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1962) (remarks of Representative
Dulski). However, the Department of Justice has prosecuted no state officials for
violation of the Federal Communications Act. The Department has initiated fourteen
prosecutions under the act since 1952-all private detectives. Statement of Herbert J.
Miller, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Hearings on Wiretapping, supra note 10,
at 364.
89. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Justice Harlan, in his dissent, noted that Justice Black,
concurring in the decision of the Court, was unwilling to subscribe to the view that
the federal exclusionary rule derives from the fourth amendment itself, but joined
the majority on the premise that its end could be achieved by bringing the fifth
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was presented with the question whether evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure was inadmissible in a state court. The
Court, in Wolf v. Colorado,40 had held that the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. However, the holding was
qualified to the extent that the exclusion of evidence thus obtained was
held not to be an essential element of due process of law. In Mapp,the
Court struck down this qualification and applied the same sanction of
exclusion of such evidence as was applied in the federal courts by the
41
Weeks case.

The Mapp ruling does not presently affect the status of wiretapping
in the states because of Olmstead v. United States, which ruled that
wiretapping does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning
of 'the fourth amendment. However, Olmstead was a five-to-four decision, and the dissenting justices, particularly Justice Brandeis, foresaw
the development of more intricate wiretap devices and suggested the
42
complexity that the wiretap issue would assume in subsequent years.

This suggests that the present Court could subordinate the importance
of continuity in the law to the desirability of making the law responsive
to changes in wiretapping methods and, thus, overrule Olmstead. In
this event, wiretapping would constitute a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, and "reasonable," court-order wire43
taps by state law-enforcement officials might be permitted.
THE WnErAP PRoBLEm

TODAY AND POSSIBLITES FOR REFORM

The legal aspects of the wiretap problem are discussed above. The

wiretap problem also has certain non-legal ramifications. 44 For instance,

amendment to the aid of the fourth. Mapp v. Ohio, supra at 672. It is probably
relevant to note with an eye to the present Court's view on the Mapp holding that
Frankfurter and Whittaker, who joined in Harlan's dissent in Mapp,are no longer on
the Court.
40. 838 U.S. 25 (1949).
41. Weeks v. United States, supra note 28.
42. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-74 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
43. See Note, 12 SYRAcusE L. REv. 361, 383-85 (1961) in which the author
proposes three means by which the Supreme Court or Congress may alleviate the
wiretap problem: (1) expansion of the scope of the fourth amendment to the states
via the fourteenth, (2) rigid enforcement of §605 of the Federal Communications
Act, (3) passage of new legislation. Since this article was written before Mapp,the
author notes that implementation of the first proposal would involve overruling

Olmstead and Wolf.
44. For an extended discussion of some of these non-legal ramifications see
Wmu.ts, ONE MAN's FREEoOM 106-21 (1962).
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it presents the necessity of balancing the individual's right to privacy
while using the telephone against the advantages that accrue to society
through the use of wiretaps to enforce its criminal laws. Civil liberty
groups have voiced their opposition to all types of wiretapping. 4r Telephone companies are interested in maintaining the privacy of their
lines.4 6 On the other hand, law-enforcement agencies and officials argue
that wiretapping is essential for effective law enforcement. The Department of Justice regards wiretapping as indispensable in national security
cases, and New York state district attorneys contend that they must
47
conduct wiretaps.
A recent survey of editorial views on wiretapping by Professor Alan
Westin, reveals general agreement that the present legal situation is
"intolerable." About two-thirds of the newspapers favored new laws
providing for limited, court-order systems of official wiretapping while
outlawing all private tapping; about one-third of the newspapers had
48
adopted editorial positions opposing legalized wiretapping.
Opponents and proponents of court-order wiretapping disagree on
whether the court-order wiretap is analogous to the search warrant.
Professor Westin favors the use of the analogy of reasonable search and
seizure in the fourth amendment as applied to search warrants and the
establishment of a court-order system of police wiretapping in the
telephone area. 49 Others have pointed out that a search warrant is issued
for a specific place, is usually executed within a short time, and indicates
the object of the search. They argue that a wiretap necessarily covers a
longer period of time and allows an evidentiary hunt, which is not permitted under the search warrant. And, the search warrant allows a
search only for the implements or products of a crime that will be introduced in court, whereas the wiretap is primarily a search for leads. Thus,
it is likely that nothing tangible will show up in court in order that the
legality of the wiretap might be tested. 0
The desirability of admitting recordings of tapped telephone conversations as evidence has also been debated. Professor Westin suggests
45. See statements of representatives of the Americans for Democratic Action
and the American Civil Liberties Union, Hearingson Wiretapping, supra note 10,
at 890-97, 406-29 [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
46. See statement of W. Coles Hudgins, vice president, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, Denver, Colorado, 1961 Hearings 246.
47. See 1961 Hearings18-19, 827-84, 854-59, 429-47.
48. 1961 Hearings 211-22. This survey included about seventy newspapers and
covered the period 1958-1961.
49. 1961 Hearings 195. Herbert Miller, Jr. told the Subcommittee that the
Attorney General should be authorized to issue wiretap orders in the area of national
security, since speed and absolute secrecy are essential. 1961 Hearings858.
50. See statements by Charles Reich, Yale Professor of Law, and Edward
Williams, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C., 1961 Hearings190, 888.
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that the advantages that might accrue to a defendant by the use of such
recordings may balance the dangers inherent in their admission. For
example, a highly respected police officer may testify in good faith to a
conversation that he has heard, but which he misconstrued when the
defendant engaged in it. If the defendant has a bad reputation and the
officer is respected by the jury, this would place the defendant at a disadvantage. The defendant's lawyer might be able to defend more effectively in such a case if the conversation is submitted as a recording
(assuming the tape has not been altered), thus allowing the jury to consider the remarks in context.5 1 However, others have argued that the
that could
possibility of alterations of the tape outweighs any advantage
52
accrue to the defendant from its admission as evidence.
Congress has encountered administrative problems in drafting wiretap bills. Who should administer a federal wiretap statute? Professor
Westin prefers the Federal Communications Commission because the
Justice Department is itself conducting wiretaps.5 3 Should wiretap
information be admissible only in criminal suits, or should it be transferable to civil suits, such as tax controversies? If a court-order wiretap
bill is desired, should all federal judges be empowered to issue wiretap
orders, or does the danger of "judge shopping" make it desirable to
designate particular judges for their issuance? Finally, would it be
possible to enforce a court-order wiretap statute? It has been observed
in this regard that it is relatively difficult to tap a line without the aid of
the records in the telephone offices, giving technical information such as
the cable and pair members of the wire and the location of the terminal
boxes to which the tap may be secured.5 4
Virtually all informed groups agree that Congress should legislate on
the wiretap problem, for wiretapping today "flourishes as a wide-open
operation at the federal, state, municipal, and private levels."55 Although
51. 1961 Hearings227.
52. Id. at 119. Samuel Dash, Philadelphia attorney, played a recording to the
Subcommittee and then played a recording of the same conversation after it had
been altered by cutting and splicing the tape. The second recording conveyed
motives of the speaker contrary to those expressed in the original conversation. Dash
maintained that not only whole words but also individual letters within words
could be altered; for example, "fill" might be changed to "id" by extracting a 'V'
from another word, omitting that word, and inserting the '" in place of the ""

in "fill."
53. 1961 Hearings232.
54. 1961 Hearings261-62.
55. Westin, The Wire-TappingProblem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,
52 CoLmia. L. REv. 165, 167 (1952). See also 1961 Hearings105-22. Samuel Dash
told the Subcommittee that his investigations indicate that in 1952 the New York
City Police Department engaged in between 16,000 and 26,000 wiretaps, although
they officially claimed only 388. However, subsequent inquiry by the Subcommittee
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various types of wiretap bills have been before the Congress since the
1920's, no bill which pertains specifically to wiretapping has been enacted. Following the 1961 hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, an "emergency" bill15 was approved by the Judiciary Committee. The bill was intended to clarify the applicability of
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act; and to protect against a
construction of the act, such as that implicit in the dictum of the Benanti
case, that would prohibit wiretapping by state law enforcement officers.
Congress has taken no further action on this bill during 1961-1962.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 1962, a wiretap bill drafted by the Justice
Department was presented to the Congress. The bill provided for wiretapping in national security cases authorized by the Attorney General,
federal court-order wiretaps by federal agents in regard to certain other
major crimes, and court-order wiretaps by state officials, if authorized
by state law. This bill had not emerged from committee at the time of
57
this writing.
Professor Westin in 1961 told the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights that he was pessimistic concerning the possibility of enactment
by Congress of wiretap legislation. He stated three reasons for his pessimism: (1) some congressmen in the minority party do not want to
approve court-order wiretapping while the Attorney General is a member of the opposite party; (2) other congressmen believe that the Attorney General should have control over wiretapping without a court order;
(3) other congressmen take the position that there should be no legalized wiretapping and they are prepared to filibuster to prevent it. These
factions, Professor Westin maintains, prevent the formation of a majority
needed for passage of wiretap legislation.58

cast doubts on the validity of Mr. Dash's data-collection methods. For a critique of
Mr. Dash's methods and conclusions, see Silver, The Wire-Tapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Prosecutor'sView, 44 MwN. L. REv. 818 (1960). Silvers contends that
Dash has written a "thriller" instead of an objective appraisal of the wiretap situation. Some of the staunchest opponents of wiretapping believe that Congress should
clarify the situation. See statement of Mark Lane, Americans for Democratic Action,
1961 Hearings390.
56. S.1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). This bill was introduced by Senator
Kenneth Keating of New York. For text, see Hearingson Wiretapping,supranote 10,
at 1. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights had decided that the situation in
the states should be relieved in a separate bill, since the situation on the national
level was not affected by the Supreme Court's ruling in Benanti.
57. S.2813, H.R. 10185, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See 108 CoNG. REc.
1688-90 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962). Senator Keating told the Senate that this comprehensive (and, thus, more controversial) bill should not be allowed to delay action
on S.1086, which would relieve the wiretap problem in the states. See 108 CoNG.
REc. 1278 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1962).
58. Hearingson Wiretapping, supranote 10, at 223.
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Consequently, it is questionable whether Congress will enact wiretap
legislation in the near future. If it does, the bill will probably be similar
to the bill approved in 1961 by the Senate Judiciary Committee that was
designed to clarify the applicability of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act to proceedings in state courts. If Congress does not act
on wiretapping in the near future, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court, if presented with the opportunity, will overrule Olmstead v.
United States. If so, wiretapping would constitute a search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and under the Mapp rule
wiretap evidence would be excludable from state courts if secured in a
manner deemed "unreasonable." The analogy of the search warrant
could then be applied to wiretaps, and "reasonable," courtt-order wiretaps by law-enforcement officials would be permitted. The evidence
obtained from such wiretaps would be admissible in state and federal
courts.
WEMoN V. BARTON*

* Mr. Barton is a graduate student at Florida State University.
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